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COMMENTS
ARBITRATION-A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE?
I. Introduction
The common law judicial system has traditionally provided a
forum for settling the many disputes which'arise between individual
members of society. To perform this function a great body of law
has developed which regulates nearly every possible relationship
between people, whether it be as tangible as a commercial contract,
or as personal 'as a marriage bond. Today, however, the courts are
finding it increasingly difficult to deal with the problems which may
arise in a society where life styles are rapidly changing and where
business dealings are becoming increasingly complex. The stress
and congestion which characterizes urban America has spawned
more law suits than the court structure can satisfactorily process.'
Lawyers and laymen routinely decry the backlog in court calen-
dars engendered by a judicial apparatus which has remained essen-
tially unchanged since it was inherited from the British nearly two'
hundred years ago.' Private arbitration as an alternative to litiga-
tion has been viewed by many authorities as an important method
of improving judicial administration. Mr. Chief Justice Burger has
stated:
There are a great many problems that should not come to judges at all, and
can be disposed of in other ways, better ways. I can suggest one basic way
that must be developed more widely in this country, and that is the use of
private arbitration.'
Arbitration is a voluntary agreement between the parties to a
dispute to abide by the decision of a neutral third party.' This
procedure, being the creation of the parties, is generally more infor-
1. Fleming, Court Survival in the Litigation Explosion, 54 JUDICATURE
109 (1970).
2. Burger, Deferred Maintenance, 57 A.B.A.J. 425, 426 (1971).
3. FORBES, July 1, 1971, at 21.
4. "Broadly speaking, arbitration is a contractual proceeding, whereby
the parties to any controversy or dispute, in order to obtain an inexpensive
and speedy final disposition of the matter involved, select judges of their
own choice and by consent submit their controversy to such judges for
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mall than court procedures and, as a result, disputes are usually
resolved faster and with less expense.'
Arbitration as a form of conflict resolution can be traced to the
English common law,7 and has been further developed in our own
case law and modern statutes.' The sine qua non of arbitration is
determination, in place of the tribunals provided by the ordinary processes
of law." Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 269, 95 P.2d 49, 50
(1939). "An agreement to arbitrate is really an agreement between parties
who are in a controversy, or look forward to the possibility of being in
one, to substitute a tribunal other than the courts of the land to determine
their rights." Dworkin v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 285 Mo. 342, 356, 226 S.W.
846, 848 (1920). See generally 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1431-44B (1962)
[hereinafter cited as CORBIN].
5. "Arbitration may or may not be a desirable substitute for trials in
courts; as to that the parties must decide in each instance. But when they
have adopted it, they must be content with its informalities .... They
must content themselves with looser approximations to the enforcement
of their rights than those that the law accords them, when they resort to
its machinery." American Almond Prod. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sale
Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944) (Learned Hand, J.).
6. Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 269, 95 P.2d 49, 50
(1939); see Burger, supra note 2, at 426; "The principal purpose of arbitra-
tion is to reach a speedy and final result and to avoid protracted litiga-
tion." Mole v. Queen Ins. Co. of America, 14 App. Div. 2d 1, 3, 217
N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (4th Dep't 1961).
7. Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 597, 598-99 (K.B. 1708).
8. The modern statutes expand the common law notion by providing
for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future as well as present
controversies. See Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice and Law, 19
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 155, 161 (1970). On the subject of arbitration generally,
see M. DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1968) [hereinafter
cited as DOMKE]. DOMKE lists six common features of the "modern" arbi-
tration statutes: "1. irrevocability of any agreement to submit future dis-
putes to arbitration; 2. power of a party, pursuant to a court direction, to
compel a recalcitrant party to proceed to arbitration; 3. provision that any
court action instituted in violation of an arbitration agreement may be
stayed until arbitration in the agreed manner has taken place; 4. authority
of the court to appoint arbitrators and fill vacancies when arbitrators with-
draw or become unable to serve during the arbitration; 5. restrictions on
the court's freedom to review the findings of facts by the arbitrator and
his application of the law; 6. specification of the grounds on which awards
may be attacked for procedural defects, and of time limits for such chal-
lenges." Id. § 4.01. In addition to the federal government there are now
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the agreement. No dispute can be settled by arbitration unless the
parties have first agreed to submit to a private forum?
thirty-two states which have modern arbitration statutes. See United
States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 09.43.010-.180 (Cum. Supp. 1972); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501
to -1517 (Cum. Supp. 1972) (Uniform Arbitration Act), 312-2101.01 (Supp.
1972) (Appeals from Arbitration Awards); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-511 to -
532 (1971); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §§ 1280-89 (West 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REV. §§ 52-408 to -424 (1960), as amended, §§ 52-413, -416 (Supp. 1969);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-06 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.22
(Supp. 1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 658-1 to -14 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
10, §§ 101-23 (1972); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-227 to -348 (Bums Cum. Supp.
1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401 to -422 (Cum. Supp. 1973); LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 9:4201-:4217 (1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-49 (Supp.
1972); MD. CT. & JUDICIAL PROCEEDING §§ 3-201 to -234 (1974); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (Supp. 1972); MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 600.5001-
.5035 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 572.08-.30,(Supp. 1973); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 38.010-.205 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1-:10 (1964);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24-1 to -11 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-9 to
-31 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to .20 (Cum. Supp. 1973), Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2711.01-.15 (Page 1954), as amended, §§ 2711.01, .03, .08-.10, .16 (Page
Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 33.210-.240 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§§ 161-81 (1963), as amended, § 175 (Cum. Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 10-3-1 to -20 (1957); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25A-1 to -
38 (Supp. 1972); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 224 to 238-6 (Cum. Supp.
1972); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-503 to -507 (1950), as amended, § 8-503 (In-
terim Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.010-.220 (1961); Wis.
STAT. §§ 298.01-.18 (1969); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1048.1-.21 (Cum. Supp.
1971). Colorado, by court ruling, enforces agreements to arbitrate future
disputes. Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean & Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232
P. 680 (1925).
9.- "[It must clearly appear that the intention of the parties was to
submit their differences to a tribunal and to be bound by the decision
reached by that body on deliberation." Scholler Bros. v. Otto A.C. Hagen
Corp., 158 Pa. Super. 170, 173, 44 A.2d 321, 322 (1945). From this case the
following "minimum legal requirements" of arbitration have been ex-
tracted: "(1) Mutual rights of hearing. Each party is entitled to reasonable
notice of time and place of hearing to be had before the arbitrators sitting
in due quorum, an opportunity to present evidence in his own behalf relat-
ing to the matter in issue and an opportunity to cross-examine opposing
evidence. (2) Mutual rights that, after hearing, the arbitrators shall render
such award on the issues submitted to them as they deem fair and
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This Comment, in evaluating courts' attitudes toward arbitra-
tion, will analyze the standards used by courts in deciding whether
issues are appropriate subjects for arbitration. Because arbitration
can have no legal effect unless courts are willing to support the
arbitrator's award, the standards used to determine whether an
issue is arbitrable are critical to the future of arbitration.
The issue of whether or not to uphold the arbitration agreement
or the arbitrator's award comes before the court when a party to the
agreement refuses to arbitrate or to abide by the award."0 Since
arbitration provisions are not self-executing, a party seeking imple-
mentation must often petition the court for enforcement." At first
glance this dependence on the court's authority indicates that an
arbitration provision is itself merely another transaction giving rise
to civil litigation. A dispute over whether or not to arbitrate is,
however, quite different from other contractual conflicts since the
very essence of the arbitration provision is a promise to stay out of
court. 2
The Two Question Approach
When courts deal with an issue of arbitrability they expressly or
impliedly consider two questions. The first is whether the parties
have formed an agreement to arbitrate the present controversy. This
is a matter of contract interpretation, 3 and if the court finds that
just-whether or not according to law. To the award attach legal finality,
conclusiveness and enforceability subject only to limited causes to defeat
or vacate the award." Sturges, Arbitration- What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1031 (1960).
10. Essentially there are two occasions which bring the arbitrability
issue before the courts: an action to compel arbitration and an action to
confirm and enforce the award. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7503, 7514
(McKinney 1963).
11. Id. § 7514.
12. See Burger, supra note 2, at 426.
13. The contract interpretation problem is among the thorniest in arbi-
tration. Judicial interpretation of the arbitration agreement directly deter-
mines the scope of arbitration. For an excellent example of the difficulties
which may arise, compare In re Wilaka Constr. Co., 17 N.Y.2d 195, 216
N.E.2d 696, 269 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1966) with In re Raisler Corp., 32 N.Y.2d
274, 298 N.E.2d 91, 344 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1973). See also In re Guilderland
Cent. School Dist., 45 App. Div. 2d 85, 356 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dep't 1974).
This case involved interpretation of an agreement which contained a
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the adversaries have agreed to'submit the'- dispute to a private
forum, it will ordinarily refuse to hear the merits.' The second
question is whether the parties have the ability to enter into this
particular arbitration agreement. The ability concept is broad, in-
corporating both the normal contract requisite of competence and
various judicial policy pronouncements designed to protect the in-
terests of society. Frequently this second question is answered by
implication. For example, when arbitration is ordered the implica-
tion is clear that the parties were competent to enter into the agree-
ment and that there is no public policy prohibiting anyone in a
similar situation from using the arbitral forum.
Recognition of a valid arbitration provision removes the merits of
the controversy from the court's concern. Judges are reluctant to
relinquish this power to decide the merits without first guaranteeing
that only the parties to the agreement can be adversely affected,
and that rights of third parties will not be unfairly jeopardized by a
private agreement between the disputants. Courts have not recog-
nized the right of individuals to submit every dispute to arbitration,
because of the conviction that the public interest demands certain
issues be decided only by a court.' 5
As pressure builds for the development of alternatives to the tra-
ditional litigation process, the scales seem to be tipping toward
condition precedent to arbitration. The question whether fulfilment of
such conditions is a matter of substantive law which need not bind the
arbitrator or whether it is a contractual provision expressly defining the
scope of arbitrable controversies has, as the above case illustrates, divided
the New York courts. Corbin has written, "If the contract provides for
arbitration only on fulfilment of a specified condition precedent, the arbi-
trator has no power in the absence of such fulfilment. It is for a court and
not for the arbitrator to determine whether there is such a- condition
.precedent .... " CoRBim § 144A.
14. "In determining any matter arising under this article, the court
shall not consider whether the claim with respect to which arbitration is
sought is tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute."
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501 (McKinney 1963).
15. While arbitration is favorably regarded as an expeditious way to
resolve most commercial disputes, "the courts will continue to assert ex-
clusive sovereignty over controversies the resolution of which is invested
with a public interest transcending the concerns of the parties to the
dispute." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501, 1968 Practice Commentary (McKinney
Supp. 1974).
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greater use of private arbitration. 6 However, courts' acceptance of
an arbitration agreement varies with the subject matter in which
the controversy arises. What influences courts to permit arbitration
in certain areas and not others? The answer to that question will
determine to what extent arbitration can be used as a practical
substitute to litigation. This Comment will examine four areas of
law that illustrate a variety of judicial attitudes toward arbitra-
bility-labor-management relations, domestic relations, will pro-
bation and estate distribution, and consumer affairs. 7
II. Labor-Management Relations
One of the major goals of the labor movement was the attainment
of an equal bargaining position for employees vis-A-vis manage-
ment. Legislation of the 1930s and 1940s s specifically recognized the
need for organization of labor and encouraged union growth. In most
enterprises, the workers and owners, however bitter their differ-
ences, must continually cooperate if the business is to function.
Maintaining such cooperation is one purpose of the collective bar-
gaining agreement-the instrument of self-government which binds
labor and management by describing the terms and conditions of
employment. Because it seeks to regulate industrial harmony the
collective bargaining agreement has been described by the United
States Supreme Court as being "more than a contract; it is a gener-
alized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot
wholly anticipate." 0
16. But see id., 1969 Practice Commentary (McKinney Supp. 1974):
"In the riptide between litigation and arbitration decisions denying the
competence of arbitration ebb and flow."
17. These four areas are examined to illustrate prevalent judicial atti-
tudes towards arbitration. Arbitration agreements will, however, occur in
many areas of the law, for example, commercial transactions, securities
exchange contracts, medical malpractice claims, and insurance contracts.
This Comment does not attempt a comprehensive study of all judicial
attitudes; instead, several attitudes will be discussed to portray the varia-
tion in judicial responses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
18. Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970); National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970); Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 173(d), 185(a) (1970).
19. R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, & D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND LABOR ARBITRATION 3-6 (1970).
20. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
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When parties agree to an arbitration provision, it is written into
the collective bargaining agreement and thus becomes a means of
presdrving the agreement as well as a means of conflict resolution
when controversies contemplated by the provision arise."' Without
arbitration, resolution might take the form of strikes or lock-outs
depending on the relative strength of the union and management.,,
There are sometimes differences of opinion as to what disputes are
covered by an arbitration provision. Parties disagreeing over the
scope of the arbitration provision will seek judicial interpretation to
determine which controversies are to be arbitrated.23 In this context
courts are seeking to answer the first question of the arbitrability
issue-is there an agreement to arbitrate this particular dispute?
Prior to 1960, the prevailing judicial attitude toward arbitration
agreements followed the New York view announced in International
Association of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer Inc.2" The Cutler-
21. Id. at 578, 581. Thus, if the parties agreed to arbitrate all disputes
arising under the bargaining agreement, a grievance concerning working
hours would be settled nonjudicially by arbitration.
22. Id. at 581. Since arbitration of a dispute rather than a strike is the
preferred means of settlement, a vigorous judicial attitude encouraging
parties to continue their own system of industrial self-government under
the collective bargaining agreement is maintained.
23. Cf. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960).
24. 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464, aff'g 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d
317 (1st.Dep't 1947); see Note, "Arbitrability" of Labor Disputes, 47 VA.
L. REV. 1182, 1187-88 (1961). Six circuits favored the Cutler-Hammer
approach. See Sunnyvale Westinghouse Salaried Employees Ass'n v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 276 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1960); No. 19322 Brass and
Copper Workers v. American Brass Co., 272 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 845 (1960); American Lava Corp. v. Local 222, UAW, 250
F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1958); New Bedford Defense Prods. v. Local 1113, UAW,
258 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1958); Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 251
F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 932 (1958); Machinists Local
1912 v. United Potash Co., 270 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 845 (1960). Foreshadowing the Steelworkers decisions, three circuits
adopted a more favorable attitude towards arbitration: Anaconda Co. v.
Butte Miners Union, 267 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1959), aff'g 159 F. Supp. 431
(D.C. Mont. 1958); Food Handlers Local 425 v. Puss Poultry, Inc., 260 F.2d
835 (8th Cir. 1958); Machinists Lodge 12 v. Cameron Iron Works, 257 F.2d
467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
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Hammer doctrine required that a dispute meet a standard of judi-
cial sufficiency-that it be meritorious-before courts would enforce
an agreement to arbitrate. "If the meaning of the provision of the
contract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be
anything to arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to provide for
arbitration." The court is not interpreting the arbitration clause as
failing to cover the dispute; it is deciding on the merits that no
dispute exists, or that if one exists it is too insignificant to require
arbitration. The result is to prohibit parties from resolving what the
court considers trifling disputes in a non-judicial forum. Using this
,standard of arbitrability the courts effectively try the merits of a
controversy under the guise of deciding arbitrability.
In 1960, the United States Supreme Court conceived a narrower
test of arbitrability which discarded the Cutler-Hammer doctrine'
and precluded judicial evaluation of the controversy when deciding
the appropriateness of arbitration. Three decisions, 27 collectively
referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy, confined the courts to a
strict contract interpretation standard of arbitrability.
The essential feature of the Steelworkers Trilogy test is what has
come to be called the "presumption of arbitrability." 8 In United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,2' the
Court held:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it
may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not suscep-
tible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be
resolved in the favor of coverage.3
Although a party cannot be required to submit a dispute to arbitra-
tion unless he has agreed to do so,3' the party seeking to avoid
arbitration has a greater burden than his opponent. The latter need
25. 271 App. Div. at 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
26. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 567 (1960).
27. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
28. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 94 S. Ct.
629, 637 (1974).
29. 363 U.S. 574.
30. Id. at 582-83.
31. Id. at 582.
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only show that the agreement embraces the controversy.2 The for-
mer must present "positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dis-
pute." 33
Other areas of the law do not enjoy this "presumption of arbitra-
bility." In the labor-management area, arbitration is the substitute
for industrial strife and the economic dislocation which frequently
accompanies it. 34 By way of contrast, arbitration in the commercial
area is an alternative to the ordered process of judicial resolution."
Because recourse for settlement in labor-management cases is hot
to the courts but to the disruptive tactics of industrial warfare, the
Court favors the use of arbitration in the labor-management area to
settle such disputes.3
The Steelworkers Trilogy clarifies the two question approach in
labor arbitration disputes. Once the arbitration agreement is found
to cover the dispute, the parties ability to arbitrate is determined
by the courts' strong public policy 7 favoring arbitration of conflicts
32. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 567-68 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
33. 363 U.S. at 582-83. The Court also stated: "In the absence of any
express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we
think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim
from arbitration can prevail .... " Id. at 584-85.
34. Id. at 578.
35. "In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litiga-
tion." Id.
36. Id. at 577-83. Maintaining this reasoning, what is the effect of Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), on the
"presumption of arbitrability?" Boys Markets narrows the application of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and allows employers to obtain injunctive relief
against unions striking in violation of "no-strike" clauses. Teamsters Local
174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), implies that there need not be
a "no-strike" clause-that a strike can violate an arbitration agreement.
If injunctive relief is available to the employer then arbitration is no longer
an alternative to "industrial strife," but, like the commercial area, a
"substitute for litigation." Therefore, after Boys Markets, should not the
"presumption of arbitrability" be discarded? The Supreme Court, in Gate-
way Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 94 S. Ct. 629 (1974),
apparently thought not.
37. See note 17 supra and text accompanying note 16 supra.
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that arise under the collective bargaining agreement. 8
III. Domestic Relations
When a husband and wife decide they no longer wish to live
together, they often formalize the terms of their separation in a
written agreement. 9 This agreement normally provides for the sup-
port of the wife and children, the amount of alimony, custody of the
children, visitation rights, and terms governing the modification of
the agreement. The parties may also include an arbitration clause."0
Thereafter, if a dispute arises over the interpretation or performance
of any provision of the separation agreement, the parties will submit
the matter to an arbitrator, instead of immediately commencing
litigation.
If a party attacks the arbitration clause, the court may decide
whether the issue in controversy is properly arbitrable. That deci-
sion depends upon the court's interpretation of the arbitration
clause, i.e., whether the court believes that the parties intended that
the issues be settled by arbitration. The court must also decide
whether it will permit parties to settle their disagreement in a non-
judicial forum.4 It is this second step which has caused the courts
some difficulty.
38. This result permits the arbitrator, not the court, to determine the
merits. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
39. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1968); A LINDEY,
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTUAL CONTRACTS (1961).
40. Couples have not always had this option. Prior to the adoption of
modern arbitration statutes, courts would refuse to enforce an arbitration
clause which provided for the settlement of future disputes. Comment,
Arbitration Clauses in Seperation Agreements, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 286
(1962). In states having a modern arbitration law along the lines of the
Uniform Arbitration Act, there seems to be no reason why an arbitration
clause cannot be inserted into a separation agreement to provide a private
and informal method for resolving the uniquely personal controversies that
occur between previously married couples. Coulson, Family Arbitra-
tion-An Exercise in Sensitivity, 3 FAMILY L.Q. 22, 28 (1969).
41. See Agur v. Agur, 32 App. Div. 2d 16, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772 (2d Dep't
1969); Sheets v. Sheets, 22 App. Div. 2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1st Dep't
1964); Fence v. Fence, 64 Misc. 2d 480, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Family Ct.
1970); Banks v. Banks, 54 Misc. 2d 186, 282 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Family Ct.
1967).
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Courts have generally recognized the right of individuals to arbi-
trate conflicts in which only monetary aspects of the divorce are
involved.4" Private arbitration has been used to settle the division
of property between husband and wife, as well as the amount to be
paid in alimony and support. This has long been true with child
support payments, even though these awards clearly affect the
child's well-being.43 However, the courts have not taken the same
attitude toward the arbitration of disputes over custody or visitation
rights. It is only since 1964 that questions of child custody have been
recognized as arbitrable, and currently there is a split of authority
as to whether private forums should be given legal sanction in this
area.
Prior to 1964 the leading cases held that an arbitrator could not
render a binding award when the parents' dispute centered on the
child." This view was based on the judiciary's belief that its role of
parens patriae demanded that it retain the responsibility for decid-
ing what was best for the child. Growing acceptance of arbitration,
however, brought doubts about the wisdom of this absolute ban."
In Sheets v. Sheets," the Appellate Division for the First Depart-
ment of New York permitted a limited right to arbitration in child
disputes. The agreement in Sheets provided that the mother should
have custody of the children and supervision of their upbringing
subject to specified visitation rights of the father. The agreement
also provided that should a dispute arise, it would be settled by
arbitration." The father alleged violations of the separation agree-
ment with respect to his visitation rights and the children's educa-
tion. He demanded arbitration, desiring that any award be set off
against his alimony payments. Although the court denied this re-
42. See Storch v, Storch, 38 App. Div. 2d 904 (1st Dep't 1972).
43. See Schneider v. Schneider, 17 N.Y.2d 123, 216 N.E.2d 318, 269
N.Y.S.2d 106 (1966), aff'g 24 App. Div. 2d 768, 264 N.Y.S.2d 9 (2d Dep't
1965); In re Robinson, 296 N.Y. 778, 71 N.E.2d 214 (1947).
44. See Michelman v. Michelman, 5 Misc. 2d 570, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608
(Sup. Ct. 1954); Hill v. Hill, 199 Misc. 1035, 104 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct.
1951).
45. See generally Comment, Committee Decisions of Child Custody
Disputes and the Judicial Tests of Best Interests, 73 YALE L.J. 1201 (1964).
46. 22 App. Div. 2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1st Dep't 1964).
47. Id. at 177, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
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quest because the parties had not agreed to arbitrate this matter,
the court added:
There should be some clarification and restatement of the proper position to
be taken by courts as to arbitration provisions in separation agreements
which affect matters of custody and visitation of children.s
The court saw no reason why individuals should not be allowed to
arbitrate matters which directly concern the child:
[T]here seems to be no clear and valid reason why the arbitration process
should not be made available in the area of custody and the incidents thereto,
i.e., choice of schools, summer camps, medical and surgical expenses, trips,
and vacations . . . The inherent power of the courts to safeguard the wel-
fare of children would not, however, be dissipated by a separation agreement
-that provided for settlement of custody disputes and related matters by some
arbitration tribunal.'
Instead of finding a private forum inappropriate when the award
directly concerns a minor, the court reasoned that parties should be
encouraged to use arbitration as a means of settling their conflicts. 0
The court was careful to point out that it was not abdicating its role
of parens patriae. If a parent, interested relative, or the child
(through a friend) could show that the award adversely affected the
child's welfare or best interests,5 the merits of the arbitrator's
award would be subject to court review. In formulating this view,
the court distinguished issues which are of central importance to the
child's development from those which are of lesser concern.2 Pre-
sumably, if the award were not of central importance to the child's
development, the normal rules for enforcing an arbitration award
would be applicable.
Thus Sheets substantially increases the ability of parties to enter
into arbitration agreements. Adhering to the reasoning of this case,
courts should approach arbitration of custody matters as they would
any other contract term, and look merely for the existence of the
48. Id. at 177-78, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 180, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
51. Id.
52. The court indicated, for example, that while the child's religious
upbringing would have a fundamental impact on his development, a deci-
sion concerning which day of the week his father could visit would probably
be of rather minor importance. Id.
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agreement to arbitrate. Public policy should not prevent arbitration
since the award in a private forum would not be judicially recog-
nized if there were a showing of a substantially harmful effect on
the child's development.
Subsequent cases53 reaffirmed the reasoning of Sheets and seemed
to signal a liberalized view on the arbitrability of custody matters.
The trend ended with Agur v. Agur.' The separation agreement in
Agur contained a broad arbitration provision. Less than a month
before the child was to begin living with his father pursuant to the
agreement, the mother commenced litigation to obtain permanent
custody. The husband moved to stay the proceedings and sought to
compel arbitration. The lower court, citing Sheets, directed that
arbitration begin; the mother appealed.5
The court set out three main objections to arbitration:" first,
uncertainty as to the arbitrator's qualifications to judge a complex
matter such as custody; second, the duplication of time and effort
involved whenever the court decides to review the merits of the
award; third, a fear that the scope of judicial supervision will be
severely narrowed" by recognizing the competence of parties to
.employ a private forum.
'53. Schneider v. Schneider, 17 N.Y.2d 123, 216 N.E.2d 318, 269
NY.S.2d 107 (1966), aff'g 24 App. Div. 2d 768, 264 N.Y.S.2d 9 (2d Dep't
1965); Banks v. Banks, 54 Misc. 2d 186, 282 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Family Ct.
1967).
54. 32 App. Div. 2d 16, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772 (2d Dep't 1969).
55. Id. at 19, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
56. The appellate division could have directed the family court to hear
the merits of the case and decide the issue regardless of the arbitration
provision, and on the facts of the case such a ruling would have actually
been consistent with the standards of review suggested in Sheets. In her
petition for custody the mother alleged that the father intended to remove
the child to Israel. She further asserted that their child's welfare would be
best served by raising and educating him in the United States. Under the
judicial standard of "best interests" applied in Sheets, this situation would
seem to present the type of fundamental impact to the child's development
which would justify a decision that this issue was not arbitrable. Instead,
the court took the opportunity to set forth several reasons why custody
matters should generally be considered non-arbitrable. Id. at 20, 298
N.Y.S.2d at 777.
57. Id.
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The judicial attitude developed in Agur indicates a reaction
against private forums in domestic relations. However, the court's
reasoning misconstrues the real value of arbitration. If an award
adversely affects the child's welfare, the court is free to make its own
decision on the merits. Thus courts retain control of the most impor-
tant issues.
Preservation of the option to arbitrate will not invariably lead to
repetition. Most people, when they include a provision for arbitra-
tion, intend to abide by the arbitrator's decision 8 It is only when
one party refuses to obey an adverse award that a court order be-
comes necessary. In cases where a child's fundamental welfare is not
an issue, argument over the merits would not be permitted and only
questions of the arbitrator's behavior or the existence of the agree-
ment could be raised. 9
The objection that an arbitrator may not be qualified to judge a
matter as complex and sensitive as a child's welfare is not persu-
asive in light of the availability of competent and specialized arbi-
trators." The American Arbitration Association can arbitrate family
matters by offering a panel composed of doctors, psychologists, edu-
cators, and sociologists.' Conceding that most family. courts have
facilities for receiving similar expert testimony and advice, there
seems to be no compelling reason why a panel of disinterested third
party experts should not be able to make as enlightened a decision
as the court.
58. The use of an arbitration clause depends on the attitude of the
parties, their animosity to each other, intelligence, and ability to adjust
to problems. Where either party has to be beaten into submission it is
unlikely that the lawyers involved will urge arbitration. Arbitration is a
way to make it easier to be conciliatory. It is most useful between people
of intelligence who really want to work something out but find a gap
between them. Where the lawyer knows that his client or the other party
is apt to be difficult or litigious, arbitration is not likely to be used. See
Buttenweiser, Foster, Kubie, Moloshok & Reinach, Arbitration and Pro-
tection of the Child: A Conversation on Implications of Sheets v. Sheets,
21 ARB. J. (n.s.) 215 (1966).
59. 22 App. Div. 2d at 178, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
60. Id. at 177, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
61. Coulson, Family Arbitration-An Exercise in Sensitivity, 3 FAMILY
L.Q. 22, 29 (1969).
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IV. Will Probation and Estate Distribution
Arbitration in will probation and estate distribution"2 is initiated
in several ways. One method is where a testator provides for binding
resolution by an interested 3 or disinterested 4 third party of disputes
arising under his will.
At English common law, a testamentary provision for arbitration
was invalid. 5 The current majority view, 6 represented by American
Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions v. Ferry,7 shows more
concern for the testator's intent.
In American Board of Commissioners, the testator conferred upon
his son, a residuary legatee, the power to render binding determina-
tions in all disputes arising out of the will. A beneficiary challenged
the son's appointment, contending that his position as an interested
party with sole discretion was invalid. The court rejected this chal-
lenge, holding that since the testator was aware of the position to
which he appointed his son he must have intended that his son's
bias be reflected in all controversy resolutions. However, the deci-
sion may not support any expansion of an arbitrator's power since
the court noted that it agreed with the son's decision.6" While the
court approved arbitration, its exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by
re-examining the merits lessens the value of arbitration and, in
effect, limits the approval. It appears that if a court disagrees with
62. Judicial attitudes toward arbitration vary from reluctant accept-
ance, see, e.g., In re Dobbins' Will, 206 Misc. 64, 132 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sur.
Ct. 1953), to jealous preservation of the court's jurisdiction, see, e.g., Tay-
lor v. McClave, 128 N.J. Eq. 109, 15 A.2d 213 (Ch. 1940).
63. See American Bd. of Comm'rs of Foreign Missions v. Ferry, 15 F.
696 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1883); Wait v. Huntington, 40 Conn. 9 (1873).
64. See In re Barbey's Will, 177 Misc. 898, 32 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sur. Ct.
1941).
65. Philips v. Bury, 90 Eng. Rep. 198 (K.B. 1695).
66. See American Bd. of Comm'rs of Foreign Missions v. Ferry, 15 F.
696 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1883); Wait v. Huntington, 40 Conn. 9 (1873); Na-
tions v. Ulmer, 139 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). But see Talladega
College v. Callanan, 197 Iowa 556, 197 N.W. 635 (1924); Comment, The
Validity of Arbitration Provisions in Trust Instruments, 55 CALIF. L. REv.
521, 528 n.58 (1967).
67. 15 F. 696 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1883).
68. Id. at 701-02.
69. Id. at 702.
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the arbitrator's conclusion it will prohibit the use of arbitration."0
The New York courts seem to agree with American Board of
Commissioners, but require the testator's grant of arbitrative power
be confined to specific issues.7' The holding of In re Barbey's Will7"
is perhaps the origin of this requirement. The testamentary provi-
sion authorized executors "to determine in their absolute discre-
tion" the specific question of which employees qualified as benefici-
aries.73 The court reviewed the executors' decision. Finding no abuse
of discretion, it declined to "interfere"' and approved the grant.
The subsequent case of In re Dobbins' Will"5 adopted Barbey's
narrow concept of discretion. The court confined the executor's
power"6 "to dealings with the testator's sister . . . and with the
specific legatees . . . .'" The New York courts thus recognize the
testator's ability to confer arbitrative powers, but limit such grants,
even when broadly drafted, to narrowly defined questions.
Some jurisdictions display a more antagonistic attitude." Wait v.
Huntington"9 suggested that executors might fabricate disputes in
order to benefit themselves by their resolution, and reasoned that
"in order to give jurisdiction to the executors, there must be a bona
70. But see United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). "[T]he courts have no business overruling
[the arbitrator] because their interpretation of the contract is different
from his." Id. at 599.
71. In re Dobbins' Will, 206 Misc. 64, 132 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sur. Ct. 1953).
72. 177 Misc. 898, 32 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sur. Ct. 1941).
73. Under the provision of his will, the testator specifically authorized
his executors " 'to determine in their absolute discretion which employees
will qualify to receive a share under this paragraph ... ' "Id. at 899-900,
32 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
74. "In the absence of an abuse of discretion by the executors, the
Court has no power to interfere." Id. at 900, 32 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
75. 206 Misc. 64, 132 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sur. Ct. 1953).
76. " 'I select John Dobbins as executor and his decision or interpreta-
tion on any question of my will must be final.'" Id. at 65, 132 N.Y.S.2d
at 238.
77. Id. at 67, 132 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
78. See, e.g., Taylor v. McClave, 128 N.J. Eq. 109, 15 A.2d 213 (Ch.
1940); In re Reilly's Estate, 200 Pa. 288, 49 A. 939 (1901); text acompanying
note 83 infra.
79. 40 Conn. 9 (1873).
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fide question." 0 In Taylor v. McClave,' a New Jersey court found
no such "bonA fide" question. The court decided the merits of the
controversy by interpreting the will as having no ambiguous provi-
sions,8" thus evading the arbitrability issue. Dictum in Taylor sug-
gests that the court would refuse to relinquish its power to interpret
wills even for meritorious questions:
This court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction by any direction of the
testator to the effect that his executor, or any other person, other than the
court, shall construe or define the provisions of a will.u
The testator's appointment of an arbitrator is only one of three
methods by which arbitration is initiated in the context of wills and
estate distribution. Beneficiaries can agree to arbitrate disputes
among themselves or with independent third parties.'
The court becomes most protective of its jurisdiction where bene-
ficiaries enter into arbitration agreements among themselves. The
leading New York case, Swislocki v. Spiewak,15 holds that distribu-
tion of an estate is not a proper subject of arbitration.8" Subsequent
New York cases have supported this holding, and have added that
questions involving probation of a will8 and interests of an infant
or third party creditor88 are not appropriate for arbitration. In re
80. Id. at 11.
81. 128 N.J. Eq. 109, 15 A.2d 213 (Ch. 1940).
82. Id. at 114, 15 A.2d at 216. Note the similarity with the reasoning
of the now discarded holding of International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1st Dep't 1947).
See text accompanying note 25 supra.
83. 128 N.J. Eq. at 113-14, 15 A.2d at 216. The court justified this
protective concern for its jurisdiction using language from In re Reilly's
Estate, 200 Pa. 288, 306, 49 A. 939, 940-41 (1901): "A testator may not deny
to his legatees the right of appeal to the regularly constituted courts." 128
N.J. Eq. at 113-14, 15 A.2d at 216.
84. See Carpenter v. Bailey, 127 Cal. 582, 60 P. 162 (1900); Stahl v.
Brown, 72 Iowa 720, 32 N.W. 105 (1887); In re Estate of Jacobovitz, 58
Misc. 2d 330, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Sur. Ct. 1968).
85. 273 App. Div. 768, 75 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1st Dep't 1947).
86. Id.
87. In re Estate of Jacobovitz, 58 Misc. 2d 330, 334, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527,
531 (Sur. Ct. 1968).
88. In re Kabinoff, 19 Misc. 2d 15, 163 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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Estate of Jacobovitz," a recent surrogate's court decision, reasoned
that the New York State Constitution confers jurisdiction over pro-
bate matters and administration of estates upon the surrogate's
court,"0 and private parties cannot therefore agree among them-
selves to deprive the court, of its constitutional authority.'
Other jurisdictions employ different reasoning 2 but reach equally
restrictive results when considering beneficiaries' agreements to
arbitrate. In Carpenter v. Bailey,93 purported heirs attempted to
enter into a binding arbitration agreement. 4 The court refused to
enforce the agreement, declaring "[tihe matter of the, probate of a
will is a proceeding in rem, binding upon the whole world. A few
individuals, claiming to be heirs, cannot by stipulation determine
such controversy.""
Two Iowa cases, Stahl v. Brown" and Christie v. Chicago R.1 &
89. 58 Misc. 2d 330, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Sur. Ct. 1968).
90. Id. at 333-34, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 530-31. In In re Kabinoff, 19 Misc.
2d 15, 163 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1957) and Swislocki, the courts' dicta
indicated that an agreement to 'arbitrate disputes between beneficiaries
would be judicially respected if such agreements arose in the proper man-
ner. However, neither decision indicates what that\ proper manner might.
be. The Jacobovitz holding, based on N.Y. CONST. art 6, § 12(d), suggests,
by way of contrast, an intensified disinclination to favor arbitration agree-
ments among beneficiaries. 58 Misc. 2d at 333-34, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 530-
31.
91. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 12(d).
92. The legal bases for the variety of judicial reasoning include: consti-
tutional limitations in New York (N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 12(d)), in rem
jurisdiction in California (Carpenter v. Bailey, 127 Cal. 582, 60 P.162
(1900)) and Michigan (In re Meredith's Estate, 275 Mich. 278, 266 N.W.
351 (1936)), and delayed passage of title concepts in Iowa (Stahl v. Brown,
72 Iowa 720, 32 N.W. 105 (1887)).
93. 127 Cal. 582, 60 P. 162 (1900).
94. Id. at 584-85, 60 P. at 163.
95. Id. at 585, 60 P. at 163 (dictum); accord, In re Meredith's Estate,
275 Mich. 278, 266 N.W. 351 (1936). For a treatment of Carpenter as a
minority view, see Comment, The Validity of Arbitration Provisions in
Trust Instruments, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 529 (1967). While it may be true
that the "in rem" reasoning of the Carpenter court is followed in only a
minority of jurisdictions, the conclusions as to arbitrability appear to be
representative of the prevailing judicial mood.
96. 72 Iowa 720, 32 N.W. 105 (1887).
[Vol. III
ARBITRATION
Pac. Ry.,9" illustrate other forms of judicial thinking which deny
beneficiaries the advantages of an arbitration forum. Before ap-
pointment of an administrator, the heirs in Stahl agreed with a
third party claimant to submit his claim against the decedent's
estate to arbitration. 8 Reasoning that neither title nor ownership of
personal property devolved upon the heirs until the estate's admin-
istration, the court found that the heirs had no authority to bind
either the estate or its administrator." Christie criticizes the Stahl
reasoning, saying that the right to personal property "vests
instanter in the heir upon the death of the owner."' 00 The cases are
not contradictory, however, because in Stahl no agreement was
made to forego administration of the estate.
The majority of courts have denied beneficiaries the ability to
enter into enforceable arbitration agreements either among them-
selves or with third parties.1'0 While couching their reasoning in
different principles of law, 12 courts decline to recognize arbitrative
ability out of concern for the interests of those not parties to the
agreement. 10 3 Such thinking overlooks the assistance arbitration
could lend the estate representative in settling conflicts and crystal-
lizing beneficiaries' desires.
Arbitration arising from the third method, the personal represent-
ative's initiative, has met with a less hostile judicial response. In the
early nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court ac-
knowledged the executor's power to make a binding determination
concerning the estate when the will so provided.'0 ' State courts'
have recognized the same power in estate administrators.' While
this power embraces the use of arbitration, 7 courts continue to
97. 104 Iowa 707, 74 N.W. 697 (1898).
98. 72 Iowa at 720-21, 32 N.W. at 105.
99. Id. at 723, 32 N.W. at 106.
100. 104 Iowa at 709, 74 N.W. at 697.
101. See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
102. See note 92 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
104. Pray v. Belt, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 670, 679-80 (1828).
105. See, e.g., Wheatley v. Martin's Adm'r, 33 Va. (6 Leigh) 62 (1835).
106. See, e.g., Wood v. Tunnicliff, 74 N.Y. 38 (1878).
107. Id. at 42-43. Contra, Sullivan v. Nicoulin, 113 Iowa 76, 84 N.W.
978 (1901).
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consider the merits of a controversy by investigating the estate
representative's exercise of discretion. In at least one case,," the
resulting concurrent jurisdiction so lessened the representative's
authority that arbitration was reduced to a meaningless gesture. 09
The personal representative's ability to use arbitration, though
judicially recognized, is limited by the same judicial caution that
constricts the ability of the testator-appointed arbitrator. This cau-
tion is most clearly manifested by courts' persistent reservation of
jurisdiction to decide the merits de novo. Mere difference of opin-
ion" is sufficient to overcome an arbitrator's award,' and the judge
who disagrees with an arbitrator's holding will prevail. In short,
there appears to be no lack of agreements 2 to arbitrate in the area
of estate distribution and wills, but the courts' inclination to pre-
serve exclusive jurisdiction severely diminishes the ability of parties
to enforce agreements.
V. Consumer Affairs
The preceding sections of this Comment have, for the most part,
concentrated on judicial analysis of the arbitration agreement. The
issues of arbitrability raised in those sections presuppose that the
parties have provided for some sort of arbitration mechanism, and
deal primarily with whether such private settlement is permissible.
This section will illustrate how both private agencies and the courts
have attempted to encourage the acceptance of arbitration in an
area where it has not been widely used: consumer affairs.
One such private agency was the National Center for Dispute
108. In re Fales' Will, 22 Misc. 2d 68, 195 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Sur. Ct. 1960).
109. See Comment, The Validity of Arbitration Provisions in Trust
Instruments, 55 CALI. L. REv. 521, 530 (1967).
110. See, e.g., Taylor v. McClave, 128 N.J. Eq. 109, 15 A.2d 213 (Ch.
1940).
111. But see United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960). Fraud or partiality of the
arbitrator overreaching, rather than mere difference of opinion between the
arbitrator and the judge, are the usual grounds for overturning an arbitra-
tor's award. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511 (McKinney 1963).
112. "Agreements" here is used to include the testamentary mandate
and the estate representative's exercise of discretion.
[Vol. III
ARBITRATION
Settlement (NCDS)."3 Its purpose was to develop and apply arbi-
tration, mediation, and other dispute settlement techniques to the
resolution of conflicts which arise in a community setting.
The NCDS program invited merchants and consumers to submit
to arbitration any dispute which arose over alleged defects in a
product, failure to honor service contracts, or non-payment of in-
stallment obligations. The project was discontinued without arbi-
tration of a single claim. The major reason was the unwillingness of
local merchants to bind themselves to the decision of a non-judicial
third party. Businessmen felt the program was oriented for the ben-
efit of the customer, and were not attracted to it. Since the project
depended upon the voluntary submission of disputes, there was no
pressure on the merchants to change their traditional methods of
handling customer complaints."'
The Better Business Bureau (BBB) has made some effort to sup-
ply the pressure necessary to secure the cooperation and support of
local merchants."' The BBB program, called "Arbitration for Busi-
ness and Consumer," proposes that customers be urged to patronize
establishments which follow a so-called "fair dealer" policy.",
Stores which participate would be allowed to display a distinctive
emblem indicating to the public that they will agree to submit any
claim to an unbiased third party."7 The plan also includes a pro-
gram to educate consumers about the benefits of arbitration as a
consumer remedy."' In theory, participating stores would thus ac-
quire a competitive advantage over non-participants, and this
would generate pressure for others to join the program. Whether this-
113. The NCDS was founded by the American Arbitration Association
with the assistance of the Ford Foundation. For an in-depth account of the
NCDS experience in consumer arbitration see Jones & Boyer, Improving
the Quality of Justice in the Marketplace: The Need for Better Consumer
Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 357 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Jones
& Boyer]; McGonagle, Arbitration of Consumer Disputes, 27 ARB. J. (n.s.)
65 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McGonagle].
114. McGONAGLE 73.
115. JONES & Boyer 375.
116. OFFICE OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION, COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS
BUREAUS, INC., ARBITRATION FOR BUSINESS AND CONSUMERS (undated pam-
phlet).
117. Id.
118. Jones & Boyer 375.
1974]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
approach will succeed cannot be answered with certainty. The "fair
dealer" program is still in the developmental stage, and has yet to
achieve much notice among business or consumers."'
Although consumer arbitration has not enjoyed wide acceptance,
there are some continuing programs for the arbitration of consumer
complaints. The programs which have achieved successful settle-
ments are typically organized and operated by and for trade and
industry associations.10 One such program is the Major Appliance
Consumer Action Panel (MACAP) which is sponsored by an asso-
ciation of companies which produce home appliances. If MACAP
concludes that the customer's complaint is justified, a recommen-
dation will be issued to the responsible party to correct the defect.)2"
The panel's decision is not binding, however, and merely has the
effect of moral suasion. 22
The Cleaners and Dyers Institute in New York City incorporates
an arbitration clause on the back of its standard claim check. If a
dispute arises, either the store or the customer can submit the dis-
pute to binding arbitration before the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation.' 23 This arrangement avoids the appearance that the forum
is dominated by one side of the dispute-a criticism which has been
leveled at MACAP.2 4 The singular success of industry-sponsored
programs substantiates the findings of the NCDS' 25 that the essen-
tial factor in making consumer affairs arbitrable is the business-
man's acceptance of arbitration provisions.
The number of court decisions construing the arbitrability of con-
sumer complaints is understandably small because of the general
absence of arbitration agreements in retail transactions. The court's
willingness to recognize the parties' ability to use non-judicial for-
ums may, however, be gauged by another indicator. Increasing
numbers of state statutes and rules of court procedure2" are provid-
119. Id. at 377.
120. McGonagle 69.
121. Jones & Boyer 370.
122. Id.
123. McGonagle 70.
124. Jones & Boyer 372.
125. Id. at 379.
126. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 11-1342 (1966); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §
213(8) (McKinney Supp. 1973); N.Y.C. CIVIL CT. RULES § 2900.33(o)(1)
(McKinney 1974).
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ing alternatives to court litigation in cases involving relatively
minor sums of money. Although small claims and consumer affairs
are not synonomous, a large percentage of cases heard in small
claims courts involve disputes between merchants and consumers. 127
It appears, therefore, that an analysis of a court's attitude toward
the arbitrability of small claims should give an indication of a
court's view in consumer affairs.
New York Civil Court Rule section 2900.33 makes arbitration an
integral part of the settlement procedure in the Small Claims Court
of New York City. 2 ' Both sides must agree to arbitrate, and the
resulting award is final, binding, and non-appealable.'
The District of Columbia Small Claims and Conciliation Branch
has a similar provision for voluntary arbitration. The methods of
arbitration and conciliation may be used there to settle cases ir-
respective of the amount of money involved. 3' The provision thus
increases the freedom of the parties to use arbitration beyond the
jurisdictional limits of the small claims court. The inference which
may be drawn is that in some areas both the legislature and the
judiciary desire that a wider range of conflicts become arbitrable. 3,
Other states have endorsed the use of arbitration by enacting even
127. A study of the small claims courts in forty-two states revealed that
the most common type of dispute before these courts involves consumer
goods and services. SMALL CLAIMS STUDY GROUP, THE SMALL CLAIMS COURTS
AND THE AMERICAN CONSUMER 141 (1972). See also Driscoll, De Minimus
Curat Lex-Small Claims Courts in New York City, 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J.
479, 486 (1974).
128. N.Y.C. CIVIL CT. RULES § 2900.33(o)(1) (McKinney 1974) pro-
vides that: "The parties to any controversy, except infants and incompe-
tents, may submit the same for arbitration to any attorney duly appointed
as a Small Claims arbitrator by the Administrative Judge of this court, so
assigned for such duty at that term of the court and upon whom they shall
agree."
129. See Driscoll, supra note 127, at 497.
130. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 11-1342 (1966) provides in pertinent
part: "In order to effect the speedy settlement of controversies, and with
the consent of all parties thereto, the Small Claims and Conciliation
Branch may settle cases, irrespective of the amount involved, by the meth-
ods of arbitration and conciliation."
131. Another method by which the arbitration of consumer disputes
has been encouraged is the inclusion of an arbitration clause in consent
orders, which result from an understanding between a prosecutor and a
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more forceful legislation. For example, Penhsylvania provides' for
broad compulsory arbitration in all cases involving up to $10,000,
exclusive of any dispute concerning title to real property.1"' New
York has recently enacted a pilot program mandating compulsory
arbitration of disputes up to $4,000. "1 This program, originally insti-
tuted in Monroe County, has been extended to other areas of the
state.
Through a combination of legislative enactment and the courts'
interpretation of the legislative intent, the prospects of judicially
enforced arbitration agreements appear favorable in consumer af-
fairs. As has been shown, the major obstacle is the unwillingness of
the parties to agree to arbitrate. Whether the parties will change
their attitude in the near future is questionable, but until they do
there is little hope for expansion of arbitration absent judicial or
legislative compulsion.
VI. Conclusion
The areas examined illustrate that the judicial attitude toward
arbitrability varies withthe subject of the dispute. As the foregoing
business charged with unfair or deceptive trade practices. The consent
order generally compels the business to make an offer of settlement to
those injured by its activities in return for a cessation of prosecution. The
arbitration clause provides that should a dispute arise over the terms of
the settlement, the issue will be submitted'to arbitration. The principal
task of the arbitrator is to decide factual issues, since the legal issues have
been resolved by the court order. For a discussion of this recent develop-
ment in consumer remedies, see Frankel, Arbitration Clauses in Consent
Decrees, 28 Bus. LAW. 605 (1973); Wexler, Court Ordered Consumer
Arbitration, 28 ARB. J. (n.s.) 175 (1973).
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit., 5, § 30 (Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent
part: "The several courts of common pleas may by rules of court, provide
that all cases which are at issue where the amount in controversy shall be
ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or less . . .except those involving title to
real estate, shall be submitted to and heard by a board of three (3) mem-
bers of the bar ... "
133. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 213(8) (McKinney Supp. 1973) provides
that: "[T]he administrative board shall have power to ...
[p]romulgate rules for the compulsory arbitration of claims for the recov-
ery of a sum of money not exceeding four thousand dollars, exclusive of
interest, pending in any court or courts. Such rules must permit a jury trial
de novo upon demand by any party following the determination of the
arbitrators . . . ."
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analysis illustrates, the courts have used the concept of "public
policy" to limit the use of arbitration. In labor-management rela-
tions, public policy encourages the use of arbitration.' In domestic
relations, public policy permits the use of arbitration only in those
matters which do not fundamentally affect the interests of the
child.3 5 In will probation and estate distribution, the courts severely
limit the use of arbitration, preferring to rely on the existing surro-
gate court system. 31 In consumer protection, public policy permits
the use of arbitration, but the unwillingness of the parties has lim-
ited its use. 37
The question of arbitrability is of growing importance as the ef-
fects of an overburdened court system and the costs of litigation
increase the pressure to develop alternatives to judicial settlement
of disputes. Before incorporating an arbitration agreement in any
document, the parties must recognize that the power to arbitrate is
not co-extensive with the right to contract. Until it is, the parties
must be aware of the possibility that their arbitration agreement
will be held unenforceable.
K.E. C. Hull
Einar M. Rod
134. See notes 36, 37 supra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 41, 42, 44 supra and accompanying text.
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